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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Many of the facts set forth in the Appellants' Brief are
not disputed by the Respondent. However, Respondent con-

tends that there are ample facts and substantial evidence
to justify and sustain the decision of the trial court.
As pointed out by the Appellant, the collision occurred
on an alley way about 12 feet wide at the rear of certain
business buildings in. downtown Provo. The Respondent,
Allen Beck, had just started out from a parl{ed position and
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was travelling in an easterly direction, still in low gear (R.
7). As the front of his car went past the edge of the building, he saw the truck about twenty or thirty feet away (R.
7). Respondent estimated his own speed at about 10 miles
per hour (R. 17). As quickly as he saw the truck, Respondent applied his brakes (R. 7). The truck, driven by Defendant, Ozias Harvey Harward, hit into the Respondent's
car just back of the right front fender, knocking the Respondent's car sideways into a power pole (R. 7). Defendant, Rhodes Jeppesen, sitting beside the driver of the truck,
saw the Respondent's car at a time when 'Defendants' truck
was thirty to forty feet away (R. 52). He "hollered, hold
'er" to the driver (R. 53). According to Defendant Harward, its driver, defendants' truck was only, travelling 3 to
4 miles per hour just prior to the collision ( R. 46) . Mr.
Harward, driver of the truck, came over to Respondent
immediately after the accident and stated to the Respondent that he was sorry he didn't see him (R. 8). Appellant's
car was pushed sideways four or five feet into a pole (R.
21). The right front end of Appellant's car was not damaged (R. 39, 63).
STATEMENT O·F POINTS
Point I. The Plaintiff's evidence was substantial and
was sufficient to .support the finding of the court that the
Defendants were negligent.
Poi~t II. The Plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to
support the court's decision that the negligence of the Defendants was the proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries.
Point III. There was no error on the part of the court
in refusing to hold the Plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law or from the facts.
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ARGUMENT
POINTS I AND II
THE PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT
TO SHOW THAT THE DEFENDANTS WERE NEGLIGENT AND THlAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE
WAS THE .
...
PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PUAINTIFF'S INJURIES.
The Plaintiff had just started from a parked position,
and his car was in low gear (R. 7). As the front of Plaintiff's car got to the edge of the building where he could see,
he saw the truck approximately twenty or thirty feet back
in the _alley from the intersection and Plaintiff applied ,his
brakes (R. 7). In order for the Plaintiff's car to have been
pushed sideways into the pole, the Plaintiff's car was obviously stopped within a distance of ten feet or less.
Appellants adhere to and argue the proposition that
Respondent's car sideswiped them. The Respondent sub-.
mits that it would be utterly and physically impossible for
the Respondent's car to have struck Appellants' truck with~
out causing so much as a scratch on th~ right front portion
of Respondent's car. The trial court heard and considered
such argument both at the trial and at the hearing on motion for new trial, and rejected that contention. Reswndent's. car was struck on the side, just back of the right front
fender, and was knocked sideways into a power pole (R.
7). The right front portion of Respondent's car was _not_ .
damaged at all (R. 23, 39, 63). AppelltUits try to explain
this away by saying that App~llants' oumper was higher
than Respondent's bumper. Appellants, however, do not
and could not contend that Appellants' 'bumper was higher
than Respondent's right front fender, which was not dam- aged at the front of the car.
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Defendant -Rhodes Jeppesen testified that Respondent's
car was thirty to forty feet away when he first saw it (R.
52). According to Defendant Harward, he could not have
been driving over ''probably three or four miles per hour"
(R. 46). At a speed of three to four miles per hour and with
a distance of thirty to forty feet, Respondent submits that
an ordinary and prudent driver could readily have brought
the truck to a stop and thereby avoided striking the Respondent's ·car, which was, and had to be, in the so called
intersection. Moreover, Defendant Ha.rward, the driver of
the car, was not keeping any kind of a proper lookout, beca..use he told the Respondent immediately after the accident,
"He was sorry, he didn't see me" (R. 8).
-The record on appeal must be read in the light most
favorable to the party for whom the trier of facts has found.
Lowder v. Holley, et al (Utah), 233 P(2) 850, 351. Respondent respectfully submits that the record contains substantial evidence to-support the finding that the Defendan~_
were negligent _and that their negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AND CORRECTLY REFUSED TO/ FIN;D THE RESPONDENT GUILTY
OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATrER OF
LAW OR FROM THE FACTS OF TillS CASE.
On brief the Appellants charge Respondent with contributory negligence for ( 1) Excessive speed; ( 2) Failure
to yield the right of way, and (3) "For failing to be just
a little more cautious than normally expected." Respond·
ent will deal with those charges in the order above set forth.
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1. Excessive Speed. It is true that there is conflict
as to the speed at which Respondent was travelling. The
trial Judge had the respective witnesses before him and
was in a position where he could see and hear the witnesses
and evaluate their testimony. He heard the Respondent
testify that he was still in low gear and that he was travelling about 10 miles per hour (R. 7). The trial Judge
had a right to believe that testimony. Moreover, Respondent urges that this testimony is far more likely to be correct and far more plausible and ·convincing than was the
estimate of Defendants that the Plaintiff was going 40 miles
per hour. HJad the Plaintiff been speeding at all, he would
readily have covered the few remaining feet in the intersection before Defendants could cover thirty to forty feet
at three to four miles per hour. The record contains substantial evidence to support the finding of the trial court.
2. Failure to Yield the Right of Way. The rule that
the car to the right has the right of way at an interse'Ction
comes into play only when the two enter the intersection
at the same time. When one car preempts the intersection,
that car is entitled to the right of way. However, in the
instant case it was not merely a case where Plaintiff entered the intersection first, but was a situation that would
satisfy the minimum requirements of the Boulevard rule·~
It was a blind corner, and neither party could see through
that wall. Plaintiff testified: "I was just starting out, I
think I was in low gear, as the front of iny car got past
the edge of the building where I could see I noticed the
truck approximately twenty or thirty feet back in there,
and I slammed on my brakes and then it. hit into me just
back of the right front fender, knocking me sideways into
the power pole on the left side of my car on the front" (R.
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7). The speed of the Defendants' truck, according to the
testimony of the -Defendants, was three to four miles per
hour (R 46). :Obviously, at that speed and with that distance the Defendant driver had a clear opportunity to stop
his vehicle had he been keeping a proper lookout and had
he observed what was on the road ahead of him. Defendant, Rhodes Jeppesen, testified that he first saw Plaintiff's
car when he was thirty to forty feet away (R. 52). As
pointed, out by Mr. Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion
in the Lowder v. Holley case, supra, reasonable minds can
and certainly do differ in a case like this, but one ·cannot
say there. was any. error in the fact finder's conclusions.
The crux of the question is' whether the Plaintiff used
''due care." Martin v. Stevens, (Utah), 243 P(2) 747. On
the basis of the record here· considered that determination
was properly one for the trier of the facts, and the record
contains substantial evidence to support a finding that
Plaintiff did use "due care."
3. Failure to Be Just a Little More Cautious Than
Normally Expected. It must be assumed that the trial
.court took ·into account all of the facts and circumstances
made known to him. Certainly, the test he applied in determining whether the Plaintiff was guilty of contributory
n~gligence was whether or not the Plaintiff used the same
degree of care and caution that an ordinary and prudent
person would have used under like or similar circumstances.
The evidence here shows that a tall building stood adjacent to the intersection. One look at the Plaintiff's Exhibits on file herein clearly establishes that one could not see
through that building. The Plaintiff had just started from
a parked position and was still in low gear, travelling about
10 mil~s per hour (R. 7). It was a physical impossibility
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for him to see what was coming on the east side of that
building until his car advanced to a point beyond the edge
of the building where his view was not obstructed. There
is not one shred of evidence in this record that a speed of
10 miles per hour was beyond a speed that would have been
used by an ordinary prudent person. The Plaintiff obviously stopped his car within a distance of seven or eight
feet, because his car was pushed sideways into the pole at
the northeast corner of the intersection. His car was about
15 feet long (R. 16) and the intersection, (measured obliquely) was only 18 feet (R. 21). When the Plaintiff could first
see the Defendants their truck was twenty to thirty feet
back from -the intersection (R. 7) and travelling at from
three to four miles per hour ( R. 46) . certainly, the Defendant Harward, had he been watching the road ahead,
could have stopped the truck in time to avoid the collision,
and Respondent feels confident that the trier of the facts
reasoned that an ordinary and prudent person under similar circwnstances would have been able to do so.
CONCLUSION

There is substantial evidence to support the findings
of the lower court that the Defendants were guilty of neg-ligence and that such negligence was the proximate cause
of Plaintiff's injuries. The Respondent urges the Supreme
Court to affirm the decision and to award the Respondent
his costs incurred for this appeal.
Respectfully subm-itted,
ALDRICH & BULLOCK;
45 North University Ave.,
Provo, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
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